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Adjusting to the strategic, business and economic changes requires efficient decision-making 
procedures which can in turn be highly affected by the underlying mental frames that the 
leaders of the organization hold. This article examines the impact of these mental frames on 
decision-making with respect to a specific attribute of a decision-making process: the belief 
that a CEO of a co-operative holds regarding member commitment. The analysis develops a 
simple theoretical  model that shows how the co-op CEO’s obsolete mental  frame creates 
distortions on decision making that can have negative effects on co-op’s strategic decisions 
and its market share. The starting point of the analysis is the case of the Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool (SWP) – a Canadian grain handling, agri-food processing and marketing company that 





Organization leaders use mental frames to simplify the world they are observing and to make 
the  decision-making  process  more  efficient.  Under  normal  conditions  mental  frames  are 
generally  very  useful.  However,  when  the  economic  environment  changes  dramatically, 
mental frames may be of little help and may even compromise the organization’s prospects 
since the frames’ reliance on past experiences may result in decisions that do not fit with the 
new environment. 
This  article  examines  the  impact  of  mental  frames  on  decision-making  in  a  large 
agricultural co-operative, and specifically how the belief that a co-op CEO holds regarding 
member support can affect the co-operative’s reorganization strategy. The analysis develops a 
simple theoretical model that shows how the co-op CEO’s overestimation of the degree of 
member commitment creates distortions that can have negative effects on co-op’s strategic 
decisions  and  ultimately  its  market  share.  The  focus  of  the  analysis  is  the  Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool (SWP), a grain handling, agri-food processing and marketing company in Canada 
that  was  not  successful  in  adapting  to  the  changing  economic  environment  of  Canadian 
agriculture in the 1990s. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The following section introduces the 
main  concepts  regarding  framing  and  other  decision  biases  and  briefly  discusses  some 
applications  in  economics.  The  next  section  highlights  the  main  points  in  SWP’s  recent 
history and discusses how certain managerial decisions may be linked to obsolete framing by 
the senior management. The article then develops a simple theoretical model of framing that 
illustrates how framing and beliefs can affect investment decisions, profits and market shares. 
The article ends with the concluding comments. 
 
Decision biases, heuristics and framing in organizations 
Understanding the way people use information to create knowledge is a problem that goes 
back to the very early days of economics. According to Smith ([1795] 1980) there is a natural 
psychological need to impose a pattern on all incoming information that will simplify and 
rationalize  the  highly  complex  environment  that  the  agent  faces.  This  pattern  is  the 
individual’s mental frame that allows the creation of knowledge and enhances the decision 
making process. 
Framing – the process of understanding and interpreting a particular event – is one of 
the most common cognitive activities (Brockner, 1992). Goffman (1959; 1974) defines frames 2 |    P a g e
 
as “principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective 
involvement in them” (1974, p. 10-11). Frames are the “schemata of interpretation” that allow 
individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete 
occurrences...  rendering  what  would  otherwise  be  a  meaningless  aspect  of  the  scene  into 
something  that  is  meaningful”  (1974,  p.  21).  Gitlin  (1980)  suggests  that  “Frames  are 
principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what 
exists, what happens, and what matters.” (p. 6). Shön (1983, p. 40) describes framing as a 
mental device that sets the boundaries of our attention, while Ahn and Ergin (2006) model 
frames in terms of different levels of awareness. 
Individuals use frames to simplify the interconnections in their environment. In that 
sense,  framing  acts  similar  to  a  model  –  it  is  an  attempt  to  simplify  complex  issues. 
Consequently,  a  mental  frame  carries  along  the  shortcomings  of  theoretical  models  –  its 
deduction results in high efficiency in decision making since the agent uses mental shortcuts 
and rules of thumb instead of considering all possible relations; however, it also results in a 
major  drawback  since  anything  what  is  left  out  of  the  frame  is  ignored.  A  basic  notion 
underlying much of the literature on heuristics is that these mental shortcuts are many times 
systematically biased (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, Fehr and Falk 2002). Loasby (1976) 
explains that “...one of the dangers in the use [of mental frames] is that they leave us ignorant 
of our own ignorance. They not only tell us nothing about the effects of what is excluded; they 
are liable to prevent any recognition that what is excluded may have some effect.” (p. 43). 
Conceptual  frames  are  important  in  decision  making  not  only  by  simplifying  the 
chaotic  situation  that  the  agent  faces,  but  also  by  defining  the  problem  itself.  Brubaker, 
Loveman, and Stamatov (2004) suggest that “...cognitive perspectives are not things in the 
world but ways of seeing the world”. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) incorporate framing as 
an essential part of their prospect theory, where they distinguish two discrete phases in a 
decision making process: a phase of framing, editing and analysis, followed by a phase of 
evaluation of the various prospects. Later studies (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; 1986) have 
documented large and systematic changes in an individual’s preference caused by variations 
in the framing of the available options in terms of gains and losses. 
Similar  to  individuals,  business  organizations  also  create  knowledge  and  mental 
shortcuts in their everyday operations. The separate mental frames of the individuals that 
comprise  the  organization  are  aggregated  to  create  the  organization’s  mental  frame  –  a 
collective corporate “mind” that becomes a central part of its dominant logic (Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1986; Grant, 1988; Bettis and Prahalad, 1995). The organization’s mental frame, once 
constructed, is more than just a sum of its member’s frames. Instead it can be better described 
as a meta-frame that filters all incoming information. According to Loasby (2001), the firm 
acts as a “focusing device for the organization and structured development of knowledge and 
skills within a cognitive framework which is reinforced by the emergence of locally relevant 
institutions”. In that sense, firms act as interpretive systems of their surroundings. 
In  an  organizational  setting,  framing  imposes  simplifying  patterns  and  allows 
individuals to share a common idea of what the firm is about. In his treatment of the firm as 
an interpretive system, Loasby (2001) argues that the new knowledge that is created inside the 
firm needs to be organized and fit into the frame in order to promote effective performance 
and learning. The impact of framing applies to new enterprises as well; indeed it precedes the 
establishment of the firm itself. Witt (2000) argues that people have already developed a very 
detailed concept of how the new firm should be even before its establishment and then they 
try to establish a firm that fits with their prior vision.
1 
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Incoming  information  is  processed  through  the  established  mental  frame  to  create 
knowledge. This process, however, also gives rise to an unavoidable biasedness since the 
organization gets used to a particular vision of the world that is filtered by the frame. Bettis 
and  Prahalad  (1995)  argue  that  new  information  that  has  no  resemblance  to  previous 
information may be discarded as irrelevant or “noise” and so the organization’s information 
set becomes artificially confined. This confinement becomes particularly important when the 
organization deals with a changing environment, since changes may fail to fit the established 
range vision of the frame and therefore be undetected by the decision-makers (Walsh, 1995; 
Salgado et al., 2002; Loasby, 2002). 
In a similar manner, Bazerman and Chugh  (2006) discuss  the  bounded awareness 
phenomenon  as  a  situation  where  “cognitive  blinders”  prevent  an  agent  from  properly 
recognizing and utilizing relevant information. The authors argue that even in cases where the 
information  is  readily  available  the  agent  may  fail  to  comprehend  its  relevance  mainly 
because the information has been deemed to be extraneous and therefore has been excluded 
from the agent's conscious awareness. As a result, relevant and sometimes critical information 
may get ignored.
2 
Particularly important for our discussion is the idea of  managerial optimism. Lovallo 
and Kahneman (2003) argue that managers suffer from native over optimism; in its most 
simplified form, this optimism implies that managers tend to systematically overestimate the 
probability of success and good firm performance and underestimate the probability of bad 
firm performance. Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) discuss how managers’ “native optimism” 
can be amplified by other kinds of cognitive bias – including anchoring, competitor neglect 
and political  pressures.  The  authors suggest  that  since the tendency  for over optimism  is 
unavoidable, the only solution lies in seeking an outside view – an analysis that consists of 
two stages.
3 Stage one involves the examination of similar cases that will help lay out the 
rough distribution of outcomes, while the second stage positions the current project in the 
distribution found in stage one. 
Several empirical studies show that managerial optimism seems to have a  particularly 
strong effect among entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (Palich, Bagby and Ray, 1995; 
Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Baron, 2000a; 2000b; Arabsheibani et al., 2000; Pinfold, 2001; 
Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). The phenomenon has also received attention for its effect on 
corporate finance. Malmendier and Tate (2005) show how managerial over optimism distorts 
corporate investments, while Heaton (2002) incorporates the idea of managerial optimism 
with respect to the free cash flow debate and shows  that over optimism gives rise to an 
underinvestment-overinvestment tradeoff. 
 
Canadian Grains Industry 
Over the last years there have been major changes in the Canadian grains industry, including 
the ratification of NAFTA and the elimination of the Crow Benefit in the 1990s, and the 
ongoing liberalization of world agricultural markets through the WTO. A number of well-
established firms in the grains industry were unsuccessful in adapting to the new economic 
environment. One example is the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP). 
In the early 1990s, the SWP began an aggressive expansion and facility modernization. 
Its main project was called Project Horizon that involved a shift from operating hundreds of 
small wooden elevators to a few dozen concrete high-throughput elevator (HTE) terminals 
(Lang and Fulton, 2004). The board of directors at the time considered this project as critical 
                                                 
2 Cognitive dissonance is another force acting to create “cognitive blinders” (Festinger, 1957). Information that is 
contrary to the established set of beliefs tends to be ignored so that the agent maintains cognitive consistency - 
i.e., her beliefs and her actions are in accord. 
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for SWP’s transformation – the new strategic positioning of the elevators and the streamlining 
of the process would result in higher efficiencies, thus allowing the SWP to successfully 
respond to the increased competition brought about by NAFTA and a more open international 
trading environment (Fulton and Larson, 2009). 
The hypothesis  of this  paper  is that the  decision makers at  the time  believed that 
SWP’s member commitment was secure and that the members would support this initiative. 
According to a senior manager: “[SWP] had enjoyed tremendous producer support and strong 
co-operative loyalty for such a long period of time that in the analysis that they were doing 
when they closed down wooden elevators and opened up a high-throughput elevators, they 
explicitly included in their assumptions that their producers would go to their high-throughput 
elevators...the producers for the last thirty years have made the decision to deliver to the local 
[SWP] elevator, and they have never had to revisit that decision”
4.  
Even though several members of the board recognized that the reorganization would 
make many farmers upset they also believed that these members would quickly return to the 
co-op. According to a board member: “It was  identified and proven by statistics that the 
membership would be upset with Saskatchewan Wheat Pool for a period of time, but two or 
three years after a facility was closed those membership would start coming back to the Pool. 
I went to many facilities and they would say, If you close my facility it will be the last bushel 
of grain the Pool gets. Everyone would get in on that theme song. We identified that after two 
or three years the grass was not always greener on the other side of the fence and would come 
back to the Pool”.  
There was also evidence of hubris and overconfidence among the senior executives at 
SWP. As one manager commented, the senior management “… committed a fundamental 
error in choosing to believe the membership would stick with them, yet they were doing 
everything in my opinion to distance themselves from the membership. On the one hand they 
were saying, they’ll come to us because we have the best service, not acknowledging that you 
had other elevators out there that could play that game and maybe play it better. Or they said 
SWP had location, but there were lots of good sites in Saskatchewan the competition could 
build a facility on. There was this attitude that we have become more business-like maybe 
farmers should become more business-like too. However, that means members could shop 
around, it is not necessary to be consistent to loyalties unless it’s in your best interest. So there 
was inconsistency in what they were saying and what they expected membership to do.” 
The argument in this paper is that this “build it and they’ll come” mentality shaped the 
senior  management’s  mental  frame  and  created  the  belief  that  member  commitment  was 
strong.  However,  in  reality,  Project  Horizon  was  followed  by  a  sharp  drop  in  members’ 
patronage and in SWP’s market share (Lang and Fulton, 2004; Fulton and Larson, 2009). 
Combined  with  an  already  large  debt,  the  result  was  a  succession  of  net  losses  which 
eventually forced the Pool to restructure its debt in 2003. SWP not only failed to evolve and 
adapt to the new environment, but it also faced the risk of insolvency. 
Evidence  shows  that  the  link  between  elevator  presence  (expressed  in  terms  of 
capacity share) and market share was present for many years. As Figure 1 illustrates, market 
share and elevator capacity are positively related. Indeed, a regression of elevator capacity on 
market share shows that the coefficient on elevator capacity is highly statistically significant 
(see Table 1). The hypothesis is that co-op leaders recognized this relationship and naturally 
included it as a central theme in their mental frame.
5 
                                                 
4 All quotes are taken from interviews of past directors and managers of the SWP as well as grain industry 
participants. The interviews were conducted during another research project (Lang and Fulton, 2004). 
5 Of course, many other factors are influencing this relationship. The point of not including these factors in the 
regression analysis is to show that even a simple frame or model can effectively capture a historical relationship 
like the one described here. 5 |    P a g e
 
 
Figure 1: SWP provincial market and capacity share scatter plot 
 
Table 1: SWP’s provincial market share and one-year lagged capacity share 
Dependent variable: SWP provincial market share 
Period: 1975-1993   
Included observations: 19   
Variable name  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
Provincial  capacity 
share (lag 1) 
1.157493  0.007240  159.8662  0.0000 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.173834 
Durbin-Watson Stat: 1.372310 
Source:  Canadian  Grain  Commission  (data  on  capacity);  SWP  Annual  Reports,  (data  on 
provincial market share). 
 
Framing and Strategic Decisions 
The model developed in this section examines a duopoly between the co-op and a competitor 
for a local market. The analysis assumes that the co-op CEO has knowledge of the historical 
market shares and capacity shares and is able to observe their relationship over the years – 
therefore for the CEO there is a historical context that plays a central role in frame formation. 
It  is  furthermore  assumed  that  after  the  establishment  of  this  frame  the  co-op  members’ 
commitment  can  decline.  This  decline  may  be  for  a  number  of  reasons,  including  that 
previous managerial decisions have signaled that the co-operative no longer operates for the 
best interest of its members (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001; 2006). Although all agents are able 
to observe the decline in market share, the data is interpreted in different ways according to 
the frame or dominant logic that an organization has developed. Frame theory suggests that in 
order for the news to be accepted, it must fit the co-op CEO’s already established frame. If 
new facts do not fit the frame, the frame stays and the facts are discarded. Therefore, is argued 
that the co-op CEO continues to hold onto her previously established belief regarding strong 
member commitment that fits with her frame and discards any recent signals that indicate 
otherwise. 
The study employs a simple descriptive model to capture the mental frame of the co-
op  leader.  Specifically,  the  analysis  assumes  that  the  CEO  believes  that  market  share  is 
determined by the following equation: 6 |    P a g e
 
  
     
    
 
    
        
       
Where     
   and     
   are the capacity levels of the IOF and the co-op, respectively, at time t-
1, and   
  is the co-op’s market share at time t. The error term    is a variable similar to a 
disturbance term – it captures any unexplained elements for the frame. The parameter   is a 
market-share  enhancement  factor  that  captures  the  CEO’s  belief  regarding  member 
commitment – stronger member commitment implies higher values for  .
6 
Project Horizon resulted in the closure of many old elevators and their replacement by 
new  HTE  terminals.  To  capture  this  change,  capacity  level  was  replaced  by  capacity 
investment in the mental frame. Thus, the mental frame is written as: 
  
     
    
 
    
        
       
Where     
   and     
   are the capacity investments of the IOF and the co-op, respectively, at 
time t-1. 
The analysis models first a situation where a belief has been established that member 
commitment is strong          – i.e., the co-op CEO believes that an increase in the co-op’s 
share of total industry capacity will bring a greater than proportional increase in market share. 
The analysis then assumes that, even though historically      , there are new developments 
in  the economic environment  that result in      . Consequently, the belief regarding the 
value of   becomes important in determining the optimal level of capacity investment.  
The CEO of the IOF has her own belief regarding   and so two scenarios of particular 
interest arise. The first is when the two CEOs hold the same belief and thus operate with 
consistent beliefs. The second is when each CEO has his/her own belief for   and compete 
with each other in an inconsistent beliefs setting. For the second scenario the IOF CEO is 
assumed to have the correct belief while the co-op CEO holds an unrealistically high belief for 
 . 
Under consistent beliefs both the co-op and the IOF CEOs believe in the same value 
  . Subscript cb is used throughout to denote results under consistent beliefs. Following the 
previous equations the market shares of the two firms are defined as follows: 
 
  
     
    
 
    
        
       
  
          
   
            
        
 
    
        
       
 
Where   
  and   
  are the market shares for the co-op and the IOF, respectively. In this setting 
the problem of the two CEOs is to choose their optimal capacity investment that maximizes 
the  profits  of  their  firms,  given  their  beliefs  on   .  Since  the  focus  of  the  analysis  is  on 
investment decisions we assume a constant markup (p-c) for the two firms, where p and c are 
the price and marginal cost, respectively; they are assumed to be unchanged over time. We 
further  simplify  by  assuming  the  two  firms  have  equal  rates  of  interest  r  that  remains 
unchanged, so they face the following maximization problem:
7 
 
                                                 
6 For a more general treatment of member commitment on co-operatives see Fulton (1999). 
7 Although it is usually assumed in the literature that co-operatives maximize the welfare of their members 
(Fulton and Giannakas, 2001; Giannakas and Fulton, 2005) the presented theoretical model relates to the SWP 
case where decisions were made by a commercially-oriented CEO. Consequently the model considers that the 
co-op follows a profit maximizing strategy (Fulton and Larson, 2009). 7 |    P a g e
 
      
           
 
    
        
                 
   
      
   
            
        
 
    
        
                 
   
 
For simplicity the time subscript is omitted for the remaining analysis. Thus,    and    are 
the expected profits for the IOF and the co-op, respectively, in period t;    and     are the 
expected market shares for the IOF and the co-op, respectively, in period t. The results are 
summarized in Table 2.  Interestingly, in this scenario both firms choose the same level of 
capacity investment, however, the co-op gets a higher market share and profitability (Table 2). 
Under the inconsistent beliefs scenario the CEOs of the two organizations are allowed 
to have their own unique belief regarding  ; the co-op CEO is then assumed to believe that 
          ,  while  the  IOF  CEO  believes  that                         .  The  primary 
equations change accordingly as follows: 
   
         
        
 
   
   
(      )       
         
 
Where the subscript ib is used throughout to denote the inconsistent beliefs case. Similar to 
the previous case, the problem of the two CEOs is to choose the level of capacity investment 
to maximize the profits of their firms given their beliefs: 
 
      
         
                      
 
     
   
(      )       
                      
 
In this  scenario, the market  share and profits  of the co-operative can  be higher or lower 
compared to those of the IOF, depending on the relative magnitude of the parameters    and 
   (Table 2).  The lower is   , the larger is the decrease in member support and the greater is 
the likelihood that the co-op’s market share and profits will be lower than the IOF’s. Table 2 
summarizes  all  results  for  investments,  market  shares,  and  profits  under  the  different 
scenarios. 
Having         implies    
       
  . Thus, the co-op will invest more in capacity than 
the  IOF.  The  reaction  functions  slope  upwards;  thus  the  two  investments  are  strategic 
complements – when one firm increases its investment the other follows, with    
   increasing 
faster than    
   the higher is   . In a case where the co-op CEO credibly commits to a higher 
value of   , the IOF CEO responds by also increasing her investment but at a lower rate – the 
higher the value of    the co-op CEO commits to, the smaller the relative increase in the 
IOF's investment. In such a case the strategic effect (SE) of increasing    
   is negative, since 
IOF’s profit maximizing strategy is to also increase    
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Table 2: The effect of management’s beliefs on investment, market share and profits 
  Investments  Market shares  Profits 
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To examine the overall impact of co-op CEO’s incorrect belief on her firm a comparison of 
the inconsistent beliefs scenario with those under consistent beliefs is needed. Comparing the 
results of the two cases one obtains that: 
   
       
                    
           
The last equation implies that    
       
        if        . Thus, when the co-op CEO believes that 
member support remains strong, when in fact member support has declined, then the co-op’s 
market share decreases. The greater is the difference between the two parameters (       ) the 
larger is the decrease in co-op’s market share. The result for market share carries over to 
profits, since    
             
   when          
 
Concluding Comments 
The model developed above illustrates how mental frames can influence the decision making 
process of the CEO and therefore affect the market share and profits of the firm. The model 
assumed that the two CEOs adopt a mental frame that gives rise to a belief ( ) regarding the 
future member support for the co-operative. In the first scenario both CEOs share the same 
belief that       . The model shows that even though the two firms undertake the same level 
of investment expenditure the co-op obtains a higher market share and profits because of 
strong member loyalty. The second scenario examines how the results change when the co-op 
CEO holds an incorrect belief regarding future member support while the CEO of the IOF 
holds the correct belief. Analytical results of the model show that the co-op CEO in general 
chooses a higher level of investment compared to the IOF CEO. Ex post, there is also a large 
decline in the co-op’s market share and profits relative to what was expected and what had 
been the case historically. 
Following an obsolete frame does not necessarily imply that management was not 
acting in the best interest of the shareholders – at least on a conscious level. Mental frames, as 
well as the other cognitive biases referred previously in the text, influence decision making at 
a subconscious level so that the agents are probably not even aware of their effect. In addition, 
these biases, especially heuristics and frames, require years to develop and were already there 
when the CEO took office. Together with managerial optimism, the frame resulted in the 
overestimation  of  corporate  projects  –  something  that  can  happen  even  in  cases  where 
managers act as good agents of the shareholders (Heaton, 2002). 
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